Education Signaling & Screening

فهرست عناوین اصلی در این پاورپوینت

فهرست عناوین اصلی در این پاورپوینت

● Education Signaling & Screening
● The course so far…
● Today
● Human Capital & Information
● Heterogeneity
● Imperfect Information
● Screening (Stiglitz, 1975)
● Why?
● Some Big Points
● Private-Public Returns differ
● Over-consumption
● For these things to be true
● The way the model works
● Model Set-up
● Education Investment
● Single Crossing Assumption
● All the Assumptions of the model
● Defining an Equilibrium
● The Equilibria
● Two Classes of Equilibria
● Separating Equilibria- 1
● Separating Equilibria-2
● Separating Equilibria – Firms
● Separating Equilibria – Workers
● Separating Equilibria Summary
● Pooling Equilibria
● Does Pooling Make Sense?
● Intuitive Criterion-1
● Intuitive Criteria-2
● Pooling Equilibria Refinement
● Continuous Education
● New Single Crossing Property
● Single crossing property Illustrated
● Output for workers
● Finding an Equilibrium – 1
● Finding Equilibrium – 2
● Defining the Equilibrium
● Why does this happen?
● Diagram of Equilibrium Ed. Levels
● When is there no separating equilibrium?
● The Social benefits from Sorting
● General Conclusions from Theory
● Empirical Evidence of Sorting Models
● Returns to GED (Tyler, Murnane and Willett)
● State Variation in Standards
● Control and treatment groups
● Designing the Experiments
● Difference-in-Difference Estimates
● Why might results for minorities differ? -1
● Why might results for minorities differ? -2
● Concerns about identification – 1
● Trends in post-GED Earnings
● Individual participation decisions
● Illustration of sorting from standards
● Compulsory Schooling Laws (Lang and Kropp)
● Distinguishing the models – 1
● Distinguishing the models 2
● Illustration of Distinguishing Models
● What age is school Compulsory?
● Results from Lang and Kropp
● Conclusions from Lang and Kropp
● Concerns/Issues
● Bottom line from Evidence
● General Conclusions on Evidence
● Some next steps
● Next week

نوع زبان: انگلیسی حجم: 0.64 مگا بایت
نوع فایل: اسلاید پاورپوینت تعداد اسلایدها: 68 صفحه
سطح مطلب: نامشخص پسوند فایل: ppt
گروه موضوعی: زمان استخراج مطلب: 2019/05/17 02:26:27

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education, type, ., equilibrium, worker, information, model, ability, employer, productivity, screening, return,

توجه: این مطلب در تاریخ 2019/05/17 02:26:27 به صورت خودکار از فضای وب آشکار توسط موتور جستجوی پاورپوینت جمع آوری شده است و در صورت اعلام عدم رضایت تهیه کننده ی آن، طبق قوانین سایت از روی وب گاه حذف خواهد شد. این مطلب از وب سایت زیر استخراج شده است و مسئولیت انتشار آن با منبع اصلی است.

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عبارات پرتکرار و مهم در این اسلاید عبارتند از: education, type, ., equilibrium, worker, information, model, ability, employer, productivity, screening, return,

مشاهده محتوای متنیِ این اسلاید ppt

مشاهده محتوای متنیِ این اسلاید ppt

education signaling screening lent term lecture ۵ dr. radha iyengar the course so far… big differences in wage structure across groups time periods lecture ۱ skill biased changes  increased returns to ed lecture ۲ group cohort specific differences unexplained by general skills lectures ۶ ۱ model of human acquisition lecture ۳ variation in marginal benefits variation in marginal costs lecture ۴ estimating returns to schooling credit constraints education production signaling screening models lecture ۵ specific capital discrimination illegal labor markets today sorting models signaling and screening signalling models as a way of revealing underlying variation in the cost parameter e.g. ability —basic spence model such models may lead to multiple equilibria which are not necessarily socially optimal e.g. lead to over investment in schooling because of divergence between private returns and total returns have very different welfare implications human capital information so far we’ve had individuals investing in education as productivity enhancing employers know the value of that enhancement and it’s the same for everyone at that level of investment don’t worry about underlying parameters that led employees to choose that level of education the level of schooling perfectly describes the productivity of all workers with that level of education heterogeneity there is some heterogeneity in the underlying ability of individuals this underlying variation may be directly related to productivity e.g. better at producing cogs or indirectly related e.g. less likely to take sick days shirk etc. the variation in ability also varies the cost of education the signal imperfect information individuals know their own cost parameter employers do not we will consider later whether the econometrician studying the market can observe the parameter key idea some type of cost information which is negatively correlated with ability. this is a prerequisite for the an observable alterable characteristic to be a persistently informative signal in the market. screening stiglitz ۱۹۷۵ what if employer required a screening criteria you have to take a test this screen is more costly for low ability types than high ability types employers want types to reveal themselves by having h types take the screen and l types not whether this actually happens on relative costs of screen c and fraction of h versus l types λ why the screen costs ch for h types and cl for l types if wh – c λ wh ۱ λ wl high ability types have no incentive to screen because by they make more in the pooling equilibrium does this make sense as a sustainable equilibrium we’ll do this formally in a bit some big points education when used as a screening mechanism e.g. if education provides information as well as skills it can actually lead to worse social conditions why to begin note that private and public returns to schooling differ there is a region of tradeoff between firms and workers restrictions education as screening may just shift screening and actually lead to worse conditions private public returns differ social returns to education differ from private returns. while screening has productivity returns it will decrease equality. for some regions there is a tradeoff between efficiency and distributional concerns. over consumption there is also a region in which education expenditure may both increase inequality and decrease net national income. overspending happens because the median voter does not pay the median share of education and thus has an incentive to over consume—especially in publicly funded schools for these things to be true highly stylized model and may not hold without these assumptions the more able are better in every relevant sense so there is an unambiguous ranking of abilities labor supply is inelastic individuals have perfect information there is not method of on the job screening the screening is accurate the information acquired is general i.e. not firm specific the way the model works there is an information feedback loop. as new market information comes into an employer through either observation hiring etc. they form beliefs on productive capabilities these are related to observable signals and adjust their beliefs accordingly to start consider a case where employers get ۱ signal pre hiring and then do not learn adjust wages model set up two types of workers h productivity level yh l productivity level yl fraction of h workers in the population is λ with the fraction of l workers then being ۱ – λ workers know their type employers don’t education investment individuals can engage in education investment or not so that the choose education level e є ۱ if choose e ۱ there is a cost h ch l cl education does not increase the productivity of either type of worker after choosing e workers enter the labor market single crossing assumption crucial assumption is that cl ch that is education is more costly for low ability workers. makes sure that in the space of education and wages the indifference curves of high and low types intersect only once. all the assumptions of the model assumptions ability is private information absent information all firms which are risk neutral treat individuals the same productivity of a single employee cannot bet determined single crossing of costs assumption these together imply that hiring competitive among a large number of risk neutral firms workers will be paid their expected productivity defining an equilibrium an equilibrium is when a set of employer beliefs generate offered wage schedules applicant signaling decisions hiring and ultimately new market data over time that are consistent with the initial beliefs. to find an equilibrium we guess a set of self confirming beliefs and then check that they are indeed confirmed by the feedback loop. the equilibria in this type of game we use the equilibrium concept perfect bayesian equilibrium the striking features are there are an infinite number of equilibrium for a given level of education that generates a maximum productivity that perfectly inform the employer the equilibria are not equivalent in terms of welfare there are also equilibria that do not perfectly inform the employer. the assumption …

کلمات کلیدی پرکاربرد در این اسلاید پاورپوینت: education, type, ., equilibrium, worker, information, model, ability, employer, productivity, screening, return,

این فایل پاورپوینت شامل 68 اسلاید و به زبان انگلیسی و حجم آن 0.64 مگا بایت است. نوع قالب فایل ppt بوده که با این لینک قابل دانلود است. این مطلب برگرفته از سایت زیر است و مسئولیت انتشار آن با منبع اصلی می باشد که در تاریخ 2019/05/17 02:26:27 استخراج شده است.

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